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THE BEST THAT CAN PLAUSIBLY BEclaimed for the national missiledefense scheme currently pro-
posed by the United States is it would
provide unreliable protection against an
improbable form of threat. However well
the proposed system might perform in
controlled tests, it always would have to
be assumed a strategic opponent capable
of developing a long range ballistic mis-
sile would also be able to equip it with
penetration devices likely to be effective
under operational conditions. Of course,
a state of concern (the new name given
to states formerly known as rogue)
would presumably bypass the envisaged
system with more readily concealed
means of attack. The entire project
promises to stimulate threats it cannot
handle.
Therein lies the reason it is consid-
ered to be so provocative. No one is
prepared to believe the United States
or more precisely, its decision makersis
now or would forever remain that stu-
pid. Potential strategic opponents are
compelled to assume the nonsensically
limited system is but a stalking horse for
a more serious effort, and the principal
U.S. advocates of ballistic missile defense
loudly encourage that assumption. The
initiative is interpreted, moreover, in the
context of very assertive plans for fur-
ther elaboration of the already imposing
offensive capabilities of U.S. forces.
Against an initiating opponent who can
choose the timing and operational de-
tails of an attack, the proposed U.S.
system is basically worthless. Against an
opponent who had first been subjected
to a U.S. attack, an expanded version of
the proposed system could be a very se-
rious matter indeedthe final element
needed to establish decisive, intimidat-
ing superiority. The real issue in question
is the balance of offensive capability and
more generally the fundamental terms of
international security.
THE ADVOCATES ARGUMENT
Within the inner circles of U.S. politics,
it is widely assumed the limited national
missile defense (NMD) system proposed
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by the Clinton administration is largely
an exercise in political triangulation
an effort to neutralize whatever partisan
advantage the Republican party might
derive from the issue without incurring
too much cost or inciting too much in-
ternational opposition. It is also widely
assumed the maneuver is yet another
of the administrations recurring mis-
judgments. Dedicated advocates of NMD
deployment will certainly not accept the
proposed limitations of the system and
in fact are contemptuous of them. They
support the project as a means of elimi-
nating the legal restriction on NMD
deployment established by the 1972
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Once this
has been accomplished, they will cam-
paign for a more robust system with a
more extensive sensor network, mul-
tiple layers of interception, and
presumably additional methods of war-
head destruction to back up the
operationally fragile hit-to-kill mecha-
nism. None of these promises complete
success for the stand-alone intercept
mission, but it would provide a more
plausible technical design. Once the
mission is established, it will be politi-
cally difficult to restrict the effort made.
To the extent they articulate their
general strategic purpose, the dedicated
advocates tend to emphasize the moral
superiority of the defensive mission. It
is better, they say, to defend against at-
tack than to threaten retaliation. They
implicitly acknowledge, however, no
feasible elaboration of defensive tech-
nology would make it a reliable
substitute for the threat of retaliation,
and they do not propose to accompany
a more robust NMD deployment with the
very drastic restrictions on U.S. offen-
sive capability that would be necessary
to make it plausibly acceptable to the
principal potential opponents. In fact
most of the assertive NMD advocates also
aggressively support the development of
advanced conventional offensive capa-
bility that is the principle concern of
such opponents. That effort is being
pursued in alleged response to an im-
pending revolution in military affairs
and is most flamboyantly embodied in
the development plans of the United
States Space Command (USSPACECOM).
USSPACECOM proposes to develop the
capability to observe virtually any mili-
tary activity of significant size as it
occurs, to attack it immediately, and to
deny similar capability to anyone else.
NMD is presented as an integral element
of this overall effort. When viewed from
the perspective of a potential opponent,
that program appears to be an effort to
establish a degree of superiority suffi-
cient to eliminate any threatthat is,
any opposing deterrent capability.
THE OPPONENTS FEARS
That, of course, is an alarming prospect
to the two major societies, Russia and
China, who consider themselves to be
potential opponents and are commit-
ted to preserving a credible deterrent
capability. In principle, Russias deter-
rent force is based on thousands of
nuclear weapons, more than enough to
overwhelm a U.S. defensive system, but
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Russia does not have the financial base
to sustain that force. The portion nor-
mally kept sufficiently alert to avoid an
initial attack is already quite small and
the ability to sustain that capability
against the pressure of the U.S. devel-
opment effort is in question. The
portion of Chinas deterrent force di-
rected against the United States is
much smalleron the order of 20 bal-
listic missilesand they are not kept
on alert status. Chinas deterrent has
long been vulnerable to a deliberate first
strike and even the limited NMD deploy-
ment by the United States would
compound that vulnerability. At some
point that cannot be precisely calcu-
lated, a deterrent force that is suf-
ficiently vulnerable would lose its es-
sential credibility and become a
provocation.
Such a fear is not lightly dismissed.
In comparison with the United States,
Russia and China both face large and
enduring disadvantages in their eco-
nomic and technical base and in their
annual rates of defense investment.
Both have reasons for concern that the
eroding credibility of their deterrent
capability would expose them to seri-
ous intimidation from the ever more
capable and intrusive U.S. conventional
forces, even if the United States re-
mained reluctant to initiate the use of
nuclear weapons. Each in their own way
can be expected to resist such an out-
come with every means at their disposal,
and it is important to realize some very
high leverage reactions are available.
Usually this is assumed to involve an
expansion and technical elaboration of
offensive weapons deployments in or-
der to assure survival and penetration
of the missile shield, but that is not nec-
essarily the exclusive or even the
primary choice they would make. They
could counteract the U.S. program
much sooner and with much less effort
if they were willing to interfere with U.S.
assets in space, which are at once very
valuable and very vulnerable. China, at
least, has noticed this and has bluntly
pointed out the United States must
choose between the continuation of
current commercial and military sup-
port activities in space on the one hand
and pursuit of the NMD/ USSPACECOM pro-
gram on the other. When that message
is absorbed, as it eventually will have
to be, the politics of NMD deployment
will assuredly change very dramatically.
COMMON SENSE
So far common sense has been a casu-
alty of the intense emotions that have
long accompanied the NMD issue, but it
is reasonable to assume it will eventu-
ally enjoy some resurgence. The sheer
destructiveness of what otherwise is
likely to happen presumably will induce
some corrective judgment. As guide-
lines for what that means, there are
some simple rules. Missile defense will
have to be deployed with general con-
sent or not at all, and it therefore will
have to be done on equitable terms.
Although the United States and all
other countries as well will surely pro-
claim the right to defend their national
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territory by any reasonable means, in
the end that can only be accomplished
by mutual accommodation. As a prac-
tical matter, no one will be reliably
defended unless everyone is. The most
objectionable feature of the current NMD
effort is that it is being conducted as a
unilateral initiative for the United
States alone in defiance of legitimate
opposing security concerns. That, we
all should know, will not work.
